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ABSTRACT 
 
Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of 
free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally 
responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory 
of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) 
cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the 
issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. 
Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist 
understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free 
will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be 
maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of 
agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic 
libertarian.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust 
theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us 
morally responsible for our actions, is not itself conceptually compatible with the philosophical 
theory of naturalism1. I will attempt to explain why it is that free will (in its most substantial 
form) is not plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. Free will (of the 
agent-causal variety) will be argued to be conceptually irreconcilable to a naturalistic picture, 
given the supernaturalistic elements required for this variety of free will to exist. In what 
follows, I will define the central philosophical concepts relevant to the thesis.  
After doing so, I will discuss the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of 
free will within a naturalistic framework. I will discuss Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort 
in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-
blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s 
reconciliatory model cannot be maintained by reference to several conceptual difficulties 
surrounding physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.  
                                                          
1
 John Bishop acknowledges this traditional view and defends it in John Bishop, "Prospects for a naturalist 
libertarianism: O'Connor's persons and causes," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, no. 1 (2003): 228-
243. 
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As was mentioned, contemporary naturalism is normally understood to have eschewed 
the notion of free will within its ontology2 (by ontology, I refer specifically to the entities 
postulated as constituting naturalism’s exclusive domain of discourse). According to naturalism, 
the spatiotemporal universe(s) which consists of physical entities such as quarks, molecules, 
trees, planets, galaxies and other spatially and temporally situated entities (all entities which 
are essentially publicly-accessible) are all that exists3. The thought here is that every entity and 
every feature (property) belonging to any entity must be describable within the languages of 
the physical sciences (or at least ‘reducible’ to languages within the physical sciences). Different 
strategies of reduction are possible, but the essential claim is made that all entities in existence 
are physically describable using the theoretical predicates found in the physical sciences. 
This ontological list of entities is derived from a strict adherence to the scientific 
method, a methodology used as the principal means by which one knows what exists at the 
fundamental level (it is an epistemological stance). Merely assenting to the scientific method 
does not make one a naturalist, but rather allegiance to the principle that the scientific method 
is the most authoritative epistemic route is what makes one a faithful naturalist. This epistemic 
stance explains why naturalists are usually reluctant in accepting entities such as numbers and 
sets (which are paradigmatically non-physical and non-causal entities) into their ontology. They 
will usually reduce them to physical features within this universe, or they might just eliminate 
them from existence. Some naturalists have formulated arguments to the effect that there is no 
                                                          
2
 Ibid. 
3
D.M. Armstrong proposes this characterization of Naturalism in D.M. Armstrong, "Naturalism, materialism and 
first philosophy," Philosophia, 8, no. 2-3 (1978): 261-276, 
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reason to admit of their existence due to their inefficacy in causally impacting the physical 
events of the universe.4 
There are similar reductive and eliminative maneuvers which can be found within the 
literature on the philosophy of mind, particularly regarding the ontological status of mental 
states (thoughts, pains, smells etc.), and specifically whether mental states are appropriately 
physical or non-physical features of the brain.5 The naturalistic maneuver is to either eliminate 
any first-person points of view which are normally found in conscious experience (my private 
experience with pain, or my private thoughts), or to reduce and situate them alongside entities 
which enjoy public-accessibility.6 For example, there is no first-person perspective to chairs 
since the features of chairs are publicly accessible to any external observer and are not 
observer-dependent. The naturalist wants states of consciousness to enjoy a similar status as 
that of the physical states of chairs, desks, planets, and galaxies.  
The hard problem of consciousness, however, is that we understand the sensation of 
pain to be privately accessible (only I can feel my pain), and yet this is an actual feature which I 
possess. Is this feature physical? If so, why is it not publicly accessible to any observer? 
Scientific entities and features are normally considered to be publicly observable. My brain is 
observable by more than one person, and the “physical” features of the brain (neuron-firings, 
electrical activity etc.) are accessible to anyone. However, when it comes to the mental features 
                                                          
4
See Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 269-270. 
5
 Ibid, 267. 
6
 Ibid. 
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of the brain (pain, thoughts, beliefs, desires, and intentions), only the possessor of these mental 
states can access them and have an awareness of their existence. The notion of the privately-
accessible is not easily reconcilable with a naturalistic epistemology since the properties or 
features of the mental life cannot be observed in the same way that, say, other features of the 
brain or of the central nervous system can be observed.7 
At most, all one can do is to believe other individuals when they report to us their own 
mental experiences. The naturalist will have to find a way in which she can either eliminate the 
existence of mental states from her ontology, or she can reduce them to (render them nothing 
over and above) a third-person feature of the brain (as opposed to a first-person feature 
inaccessible to scientific investigation and thus not “naturalistic”). Every philosophical naturalist 
is going to be a physicalist, but not every physicalist is committed to the naturalistic project. 
Physicalism is the thesis that every event is physical (this definition will suffice for this section, 
though the thesis of physicalism will be elaborated upon in the next section). The physicalist is 
not committed to the denial of the ontological reality of numbers, for instance. The physicalist 
is simply committed to the claim that every substance (every entity possessing features or 
properties) is entirely describable using the language of the physical sciences.  This is the 
philosophical vocation of the naturalist and in doing so she embraces the title of ‘physicalist’ 
regarding mental states.  
                                                          
7
 Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, & Free Will, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 87-93. 
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In this thesis, I will be discussing what I call “Anthropological Physicalism” which is to say 
that I will be focusing on the doctrine of physicalism only insofar as it relates to the human 
person as a substantial entity. I will reference naturalism only insofar as it serves as the 
backdrop or justification for O’Connor’s view of the human person as a physical organism (and 
substance), though he grants that consciousness is not a physical property of this physical 
organism. To be clear, O’Connor is not a physicalist in the category of property (though he holds 
that all human persons are physical in the category of substance).8 O’Connor personally grants 
the non-physicality of consciousness (this will be discussed in Chapter 2), but his theory of free 
will is intended to be a thoroughly naturalistic and even physicalistic picture of free will. In 
other words, his theory of free will is supposed to be acceptable to physicalists and naturalists, 
even if he personally does not accept some of the positions (regarding the ontology of mental 
states) held by both.  
O’Connor advances an agent-causal theory of libertarian free will, which is a non-
deterministic understanding of free will and he wants to wed this view to an ontologically 
naturalistic picture of the world. I will argue that while his agent-causal theory of free will does 
not suffer from any obvious deficiencies in its robustness, the theses of naturalism and 
physicalism cannot allow for his robust account to be naturalized in principle. In this thesis, I 
will argue that O’Connor’s view of free will not only renders his attempt to reconcile 
                                                          
8
 O’Connor holds that human persons are emergent individuals; mental states are emergent upon the biological 
organisms that possess them. Humans are fundamentally physical substances, even in spite of having non-physical 
mental properties. See Timothy O’Connor, and Jonathan Jacobs, "Emergent Individuals," The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 53, no. 213 (2003): 540-555, http://www.jonathandjacobs.com/resources/papers/OConnorJacobs-
EmergentIndividuals.pdf (accessed April 14, 2014). 
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physicalism and free will impossible, but it also creates insurmountable worries for a 
reconciliation between naturalism and O’Connor’s view of free will, seeing that naturalism plays 
a pivotal role as the basis for O’Connor’s reconciliatory project.  
 
The Challenge of Free Will 
 
To understand how free will poses a threat to naturalism (or perhaps, how naturalism 
poses a threat to free will) one must understand that naturalism is usually associated (in some 
version or other) with physicalism. By physicalism, what is meant is that everything is composed 
of fundamentally physical entities (e.g. atoms, quarks, fields) and all things (substances) act in 
accordance with the laws of nature.  
The concept of “physical” is constrained by what we find within the naturalistic 
epistemic stance such that what we deem to be physical must be described in the language of 
physics, chemistry or in the language of any other physical science. It is noticeable how 
physicalism is in some sense or other parasitic upon the thesis of naturalism. Both theses betray 
a deep reverence for knowledge acquired through an appropriation of the scientific method. 
While physicalism is notoriously difficult to define, the most precise definition of physicalism in 
my estimation has been offered by David Chalmers who defines physicalism as:  
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“Physicalism is true of our world iff any world that is a physical duplicate of our world is either a 
duplicate of our world simpliciter or it contains a duplicate of our world as a proper part.”9 
 
Another way to understand physicalism is by way of the causal closure thesis, which is 
as follows: 
“The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a 
physical cause at t.”10 
 
The purpose behind the causal closure principle is that in order to have an ideally 
complete physical theory, it must be able to explain every physical event in terms of a physical 
cause (which turns out to be another physical event). This finalized physical theory cannot leave 
out an explanation for any particular event. If there is no physical event which causally explains 
a particular physical event, then this “theory of everything” is incomplete and physicalism must 
be false since there are non-physical causal explanations for certain physical events. In order to 
have a causally unified scientific picture, one must assume that the universe is causally closed 
from non-physical causal powers. Naturalism is similarly committed to such a notion. Moreover, 
the causal closure of the universe requires the conservation of energy and therefore precludes 
the injection of energy into the universe by non-physical events. The causal closure thesis is 
relevant to the present examination of the incompatibility between a robust theory of free will 
                                                          
9
 This simple formulation of Chalmers’ definition is provided in Howell, Robert. Consciousness and the Limits of 
Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
10
 Jaegwon Kim has formulated this causal closure principle consistent with physicalism in Jaegwon Kim, 
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 15. 
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and both naturalism and physicalism, and so the causal closure thesis’ impact upon this 
discussion will be elucidated after a discussion on the nature of free will, which I turn to now.  
 
The Incompatibility of Event Causation and Free Will 
 
In order to understand the conceptual dissimilarity between event causation and what 
O’Connor’s robust notion of free will requires (namely, agent causation), event causation must 
be adequately defined. The agent is understood to act freely as a constituent of an event by 
determinists and event-causal libertarians (“libertarian” referring to a non-deterministic or 
indeterministic understanding of human action). The various theories of free will which require 
deterministic (or indeterministic) events in order for humans to act freely will not be 
exhaustively discussed, but a broad description will be offered (though the deterministic 
account of free will shall be discussed further in Chapter 2).11 The notion of event causation 
(deterministic and otherwise) will be the focus of the discussion in this section. 
 The thesis of determinism states that every present event is entailed by a full 
description of all past events conjoined with a description of the laws of nature. A full 
description of both every past event (or a full description of the Universe at a particular time 
t[x]) and the relevant laws of nature would be sufficient to accurately foreknow a complete 
                                                          
11
 A comprehensive treatment of the possible compatibility between free will and determinism can be found in 
John Martin Fischer, "Compatibilism," Four Views on Free Will, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 44-84. 
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description of any future event (or any event whether past or future at any other time t[y]). 
This would require every future event to be an inevitable consequence of past events in 
conjunction with the laws of nature.12  
David Lewis expressed the thesis of determinism by asking us to imagine a possible 
world (namely ours) that has a specific collection of past events. If one were to survey the 
infinite collection of possible worlds and fail to find a possible world that has the same past as 
ours and yet has a different future than our world, then our possible world is a deterministic 
world.13 In other words, (for the determinist) every possible world with the same past as our 
world will necessarily have the same future (and that is what would render our world 
deterministic). This would be due to the fact that the past causally necessitates the present and 
future. There could not be two possible deterministic worlds with the same past up to the year 
2014 which causally diverge in the year 2014.  
Another way to express this thesis would be in terms of the occurrence of an event. 
According to determinism, events necessitate subsequent events to occur. Every possible world 
with the same series of past events as a deterministic world will have (by necessity) the same 
type of present and future events in that world. An event is the instantiation (or the realization) 
                                                          
12 John Bishop formulates the thesis of determinism in this fashion in John Bishop, "Prospects for a Naturalist 
Libertarianism: O'Connor's Persons and Causes," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, no. 1 (2003): 
230-231. 
13 David Lewis, "New work for a theory of universals," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61, no. 4 (1983): 359-
361. 
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of a substance’s (or thing’s) possession of a property (or feature).14 More specifically, an event 
is a change of state within one or more substances.15 By instantiation, I merely refer to the 
coming to be of a feature (I use “feature” synonymously with the term “property”) possessed 
by a substance. For example, a brown chair that is painted red will be involved in an event (as it 
will possess a new feature at some time or other at some time in the future). In this example, 
the future event will be caused by the past event of the painting of the chair. The painting of 
the chair is an event which consists in the painter’s possession of many features (e.g. possessing 
a brush, intention to paint). This event is itself a change of state owing its existence to yet 
another temporally prior event.  
In these instances, the person qua agent (or substance) is not responsible for the 
painting of the chair but she is a constituent of an event along with the chair, her brush, and 
even her mental intention (and other occurrent mental states). The complete event is what 
contributes to the occurrence of the painted chair. The human agent qua agent is causally 
inefficacious and is a mere constituent of a causally efficacious event. It is not the agent who 
causes the chair to be red, but the agent’s intending and carrying out her intention to paint 
with her brush (this change in state is an event). In this view, the states of the agent do all of 
the explaining. Physical events operate according to the laws of nature (whether deterministic 
or probabilistic) and agents themselves do not violate these laws of nature in this event-causal 
                                                          
14
Here I follow Jaegwon Kim’s classical defense of the property-exemplification account of events found in 
Jaegwon Kim, "Events as Property Exemplifications," Action Theory, 97 (1976): 159-177. 
15
 See Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, & Free Will, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6. 
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understanding of action. Agents qua agent do not make a difference to the occurrence of an 
event; only agents insofar as they are parts of events make a difference on this view.16  
While events are connected by laws of nature, but some models of free will allow for an 
agent qua agent (in the absence of being part of an event) to execute intentions which cause 
events (the carrying out of an action). In the standard agent-causal libertarian model of free 
will, an agent is not causally influenced by prior events to cause further events via some 
connecting law between both events (as this would make the agent a constituent of the initial 
event). Rather, the agent possesses a sui generis (of its own kind) ability to execute certain 
intentions in the absence of any event of which the agent may be a part. Therefore, one has 
fundamentally two kinds of causation in reality: Event-causation and agent-causation. The free 
agent cannot be subsumed under certain laws which describe the regular causes and effects 
between events. The agent in itself must be the appropriate source for her own control.17  
The model of free will which will be discussed eschews a deterministic (or even 
probabilistic) nomological mechanism for the exercise of the will. It also disavows the notion 
that even probabilistic laws can ground freedom. If the action of an agent is contingent upon an 
external non-deterministic (probabilistic) antecedent event which originated outside of the 
agent’s control, it would still not be sufficient to be classified as a free action.18 Likewise, if the 
                                                          
16 Timothy O’Connor competently explains the differences between an agent as cause and an event as cause in 
Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 67-73. 
17 An exhaustive account of this model (the agent-causal libertarian model) can be found in Timothy O'Connor, 
"Agent Causation," Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, ed. Timothy O'Connor (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 173-200. 
18
 This non-deterministic event-causal view will be further elucidated in the next section. 
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event of an agent’s formation and execution of an intention (in the form of an action) has been 
probabilistically fixed by prior events, then the agent is still a mere constituent of an event and 
makes no significant causal contribution as an agent over and above the event of which she is a 
part of causally contributes. 
The agent would still be part of an event whose causal connection with prior and 
subsequent events is probabilistic as opposed to being merely deterministic. For the agent to 
have a final say in the matter, or to settle the action, she must act spontaneously as a first 
cause of her action in the absence of past events that determine any act of the will. The agent 
must exercise some intrinsic faculty (or power) and this exertion must be such that it occurs in 
the absence of any prior causally sufficient conditions. This absence of prior causally sufficient 
conditions requires the agent to possess an intrinsic capacity to exert active causal influence.  
I will sketch what I consider to be a full-blooded conception of free will, but a defense of 
this view will be delayed for the next chapter. Actions exercised by the person’s will are 
explained by the reasons the agent had for acting in order to fulfill the content of those 
reasons.  A choice (or decision) is a settled intention to act (immediately or at some point in the 
future), and the will is the faculty which brings about the formation of an intention. Choices 
may or may not result in an external action (such as the choice to raise one’s hand while it is 
severely damaged).  Since one is intending as an agent to directly execute an action, this 
qualifies as an exercise of agency (more precisely, an exercise of rational agency due to the 
reasons involved in forming the intention to execute an act). The freedom of the will refers to 
13 
 
the fact that the agent is not restrained in her forming of certain intentions by her faculty (the 
will) and the execution of those intentions is similarly unrestrained (though the resulting 
external act may be unsuccessful due to some external impediments). The phrases “freedom of 
choice” and “freedom of action” similarly convey this familiar point (in my view, choices are 
always made for reasons, there are no unconscious choices).  
One may contrast this with merely being acted upon, wherein we are merely passive 
participants in events which are casually produced by prior events which subsequently cause us 
to enter into a state which causes us to act. As stated earlier, agent-causal power (the capacity 
or power to exercise one’s rational agency in forming intentions to act) must be exercised in the 
absence of prior causally sufficient conditions19. In order for there to be free will, the state of 
the brain at a time t(1) does not determine the state of the brain at t(2). In other words, prior to 
forming an intention at t(2), the state of my brain at t(1) in conjunction with all of the other 
facts of the universe in conjunction with the laws of nature which may mutually determine 
future facts about me, do not (in concert with one another) determine my own forming of an 
intention (which may culminate in a decision) to act at t(2).  
There is a noticeable gap between the state of the brain at t(1) and the state of the 
brain at t(2), due to the fact that a free action originates in the absence of prior determining 
                                                          
19
 A comprehensive account of such a power or capacity is found in Timothy O'Connor, "Agent Causation," Agents, 
Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, ed. Timothy O'Connor (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 173-200. 
14 
 
conditions.20 Nothing externally acts upon the individual’s brain states so as to cause the brain 
to enter into an intention-forming state (which consequently executes the intention in the form 
of an action). For the agent-causalist, the agent injects causal influence upon events from above 
(so to speak) without herself being involved in an event (or caused to be in an event by a prior 
event) which is ultimately responsible for this causal influence. By contrast, an event-causal 
understanding of an agent’s action would render the brain a passive participant within the 
event, which relies upon the energy-transfer of the previous state to cause the action. Matter 
is, as it seems, intrinsically passive or inert in that it relies upon external causal conditions 
(being in such and such a state or event) in concert with the laws of nature for it to make any 
causal contributions to any event.21  
Physical objects do not seem to possess any intrinsically active causal powers (powers 
that are exercisable in the absence of any powers external to them which would cause or 
determine them to act). Free agents, on the other hand, must be able to exercise an agency 
that is by its very nature spontaneous and not determined (or even probabilistically fixed) by 
prior internal or external states of the agent. In a naturalistic universe, an individual with 
knowledge of every relevant physical state and feature combined with knowledge of the 
operating laws of nature would be able to predict what will occur in the future (assuming that 
the universe is fundamentally deterministic).  
                                                          
20
 Searle makes this astute observation in John Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 232. 
21
 J.P. Moreland makes this very point in James Porter Moreland, "Naturalism and Libertarian Agency," Philosophy 
& Theology, 10, no. 2 (1997): 353-383. 
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An omniscient individual would be able to predict what would probably occur given 
certain probabilistically fixed laws of nature (if we allow for the possibility of a fundamentally 
indeterministic universe). This knowledge would only be possible if this individual had 
knowledge of a completed ideal theory of physics of some sort that we currently do not 
possess. If we assume a naturalistic ontology, whereby the only entities and features (or states) 
that exist are those that are characterized in the physical sciences, then this individual would 
have knowledge of the future universe.22 
A total understanding of all physical facts is sufficient to inform us of what the future 
will be like only because present (or past events) events determine (or entail) future events. 
Due to this naturalistic stance, the naturalist will hold that the physical universe is causally 
closed in the sense that there are no causal gaps. A complete knowledge of the state of the 
universe at time t(1) will yield a state of the universe at t(2) that can be reasonably entailed by 
the state of the universe at t(1). There are not supposed to be any mind-boggling surprises if we 
have an omniscient understanding of all of the physical states and laws of nature at work at 
some time t(x) in the universe. However, allowing for the existence of a rational individual with 
an agent-causal capacity (the ability to act as a cause of actions [for reasons] not caused by 
prior events and the ability to refrain from such actions [for reasons]) threatens this naturalistic 
outlook of the physical causal closure. No longer would knowledge of the complete universe at 
some prior time t(x) entail certain results regarding future states of the universe. As was 
                                                          
22
 Carl Ginet makes a similar argument regarding causal closure in Carl Ginet, On Action, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 92. 
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previously stated, the agent would inject causal influence (and thus new energy not derivable 
from previous physical events) upon events without being caused to do so (or being part of an 
event).  
What if one wants to maintain a non-deterministic view of free action but desires to 
uphold an event-causal view? In this view, one must propose that the universe is not solely 
deterministic but is also indeterministic. In this case, a physical event x at t(1) will not always 
necessitate physical event y at t(2), but rather x might render it probabilistically likely (any 
probability under 1 may be assigned) that event y will occur at t(2). In this case, the causal 
power of x simply fixes the probability assigned to the possible occurrence of y. This, however, 
is not to be taken as an example of intrinsic agent-causal power. Physical event x has a (let us 
stipulate) 0.5% chance of resulting in physical event y only due to the fact that x itself has a 
prior physical cause or state which necessitates or determines the probability it currently has 
(namely 0.5%) of producing physical event y. There is no causal acting “from above”; all causal 
energy is derived from previous events.  
In other words, it has a derived causal efficacy from prior events as opposed to 
intrinsically possessing active agency to spontaneously produce events.23 In a critique of event-
causal libertarian Mark Balaguer, philosopher Derk Pereboom argued that if the state an agent 
is in at t(1) is simply due to prior external events or even prior internal states, and that state is 
                                                          
23
 This indeterministic view of free will which does not require a causal relation between agent and event but 
consists in causation between probabilistic events is known as event-causal libertarianism. Robert Kane defends 
this view in Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
17 
 
what solely contributes to what occurs at t(2), then the agent itself (qua agent) makes no causal 
contribution. In other words, for an event-causalist, a probabilistic agent cause is just as passive 
and intrinsically inert as a deterministic agent cause (in the absence of any states or events).24 
Both of their properties are subsumed under laws of nature (property F affects property G due 
to a law of nature, but property F qua property F is not causally efficacious without being 
connected to another property via laws of nature). Due to the genuinely spontaneous power 
entailed by freedom of the will, rational agents have a dual-ability25 to either form an intention 
or to refrain from forming an intention. Both are expressions of this sui generis capacity. I will 
now turn to consider a test-case in which naturalist John Searle espouses both libertarianism 
and an adherence to naturalistic principles.  
 
John Searle’s Libertarianism  
 
The previous section illustrates the tough issue of achieving a commensuration between 
agent-causal free will and naturalism, but some philosophers have faced this challenge head-on 
and have attempted to elucidate their own naturalistic theories of free will which incorporate 
purely physicalistic entities. For instance, John Searle has recently advocated a version of 
naturalistic libertarianism (libertarianism referring to the indeterministic notion of free will 
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currently in discussion). Despite his ardent naturalism, Searle has attempted to reconcile his 
naturalistic view of the human person with our own suspicion of freedom.26 In reality, his view 
has more in common with the probabilistic event-causal view that Pereboom eschews.27  
His theory relies upon the notion that physical states and quantum indeterminacy 
probabilistically fix the chances that the agent will act in virtue of some reasons for action over 
others. He assures his readers that it is an “indeterminacy of a nonrandom kind”28, but he fails 
to introduce any meaningful conceptual distinction between indeterminate brain states and 
random brain states. Searle is also committed to the causal closure of the physical universe29 
which requires every physical event to be wholly explained in terms of prior physical causes,30 
which would entail that an agent has no causal powers beyond the causal powers bestowed 
upon her by prior physical events, rendering her future choices probabilistically fixed by prior 
physical events.  
Searle’s adherence to the causal closure principle precludes his endorsement of any 
notion of an intrinsically active power possessed by the agent. Searle’s naturalism requires him 
to argue that the agent’s causal powers (and the exercise thereof) are solely inherited from 
prior physical events. If the agent’s exercise of causal power is not due to any prior physical 
event, then it has no prior physical cause and would be a paradigmatic example of the violation 
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28
 Ibid. 
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of the causal closure of the universe. The agent-cause inserts causal power into the universe 
from above, energy which was not transferred from prior physical states or events. Despite 
these shortcomings, Searle’s attempt to reconcile free will and physicalism is informative in that 
it demonstrates the incompatibility between the causal closure thesis (a principle of physicalism 
and naturalism) and free will. In the next section, I will consider what the causal closure thesis 
entails in terms of the causal inheritance possessed by higher-level features and contributed by 
lower-level phenomena. A distinction will be made between a naturalistic understanding of 
personal agency and the agent-causal understanding thereof.  
 
A Hierarchical Conception of Reality 
 
Naturalists usually view causation as being bottom-up. In other words, the fundamental 
physical entities are microphysical entities (e.g. particles). In reality there exists a hierarchy of 
entities that range from microphysical entities to macrophysical entities (e.g. chairs, humans, 
buildings, galaxies). The higher levels are causally and ontologically reducible to the lower 
levels, so that sciences that engage with lower-level phenomena (such as physics or chemistry) 
may always have their language translated into the scientific languages that refer to higher-
level phenomena (such as geology or astronomy).  
While the concepts behind these languages are not conceptually identical, they may 
nevertheless be causally and ontologically reducible to lower-level phenomena (since all of the 
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causal powers of geological and astral bodies are derived from lower-level entities such as 
atoms and quarks). In other words, we can entail (or determine) the higher-level entities from 
the lower-level entities. There is an obvious and undeniable dependency relationship between 
all levels of physical reality that can be accounted for in an ideally completed theory of physics. 
Any complete lower-level description of all of the entities will not leave out any causal powers 
or properties (features) which we find in the higher-levels due to the fact that the higher-levels 
derive their causal efficacy solely and completely from the lower-level entities. 
There is what is known as a supervenience relationship.31 Higher-level entities and 
properties of entities depend upon lower-level entities and properties. Due to this, there is no 
change in a micro feature without some change in a macro feature (however small it may be). 
Similarly, there is no change a macro feature without some change in a micro feature. This is 
because the macro is nothing over and above the micro. The micro features are simply a 
narrower description of the broad whole (which may be described using the language of 
sciences that deal with macro-entities and features). The emergence in this view is simply an 
apparent “epistemological” emergence; our knowledge of the macro-properties is emergent 
upon the micro-properties (of which we may know nothing).32 In reality, the micro-properties 
are simply a narrower description of the broader macro-phenomena. There is a tight feed-back 
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relationship between all levels of physical reality, though this is not to be taken as a suggestion 
that micro-entities have independent causal powers from the macro-entities (or vice-versa), but 
rather that the constituents of macro-entities are explained in terms of micro-entities (this is 
the bottom-up picture).  
Now, contrast this with free will. Free choices are not determined by the lower-level 
microphysical entities. In fact, instead of there being a bottom-up causal chain (where the 
lower-level properties contribute towards the causal efficacy and causal manifestation of 
higher-level properties) there is the notion of top-down causation (or acting from above). The 
macro-entity (the human agent) forms an intention (in the absence of any bottom-up 
determining influence) and the executed intention causes the microphysical entities to produce 
an effect (e.g. the rising of one’s arm). While the agent-causal capacity may be exist in virtue of 
the micro-entities, the performance of an action is carried out by the agent and is not a 
consequence of a state or event in which micro-entities participate. 
 It is understandable why a naturalist would be uncomfortable with that proposition. For 
Searle, an advocate of the causal closure thesis, top-down causation (or top-down explanation) 
is only a reality in virtue of bottom-up causation. He argues: 
 
“Since all of the surface features of the world are entirely caused by and realised in systems of 
micro-elements, the behavior of micro-elements is sufficient to determine everything that 
happens. Such a 'bottom up' picture of the world allows for top-down causation (our minds, for 
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example, can affect our bodies). But top-down causation only works because the top level is 
already caused by and realized in the bottom levels.”33 
 
In other words, all macro-level phenomena are explained in terms of micro-level 
phenomena. This precludes the notion that an agent has an irreducible active power to produce 
changes in her physical behavior, and that such a power (and its execution) is not explained in 
terms of deterministic or probabilistic micro-level phenomena. For Searle, every execution of 
an intention can be explained solely by reference to the events occurring at the micro-level (e.g. 
the interaction of molecules). The faithful physicalist has no other choice.34 
Perhaps not all is lost for the physicalist. Perhaps one may reject the causal closure 
thesis and still be a faithful physicalist and naturalistic libertarian. In what follows, I will discuss 
the conditions required for free will, only then to discuss a particularly naturalistic agent-causal 
libertarian theory of free will which attempts to reconcile freedom and a commitment to 
philosophical naturalism. In particular, I will discuss Timothy O’Connor’s theory of a naturalistic 
agent-causal libertarianism. In doing so, I will argue that philosophical naturalism (and more 
specifically, anthropological physicalism) is conceptually incompatible with what I understand 
to be robust freedom of the will (namely agent-causal libertarianism). In the next chapter, I will 
elucidate an agent-causal theory of free will. 
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CHAPTER 2: DEFINING “FREE WILL” 
 
There are variegated notions and conceptualizations of free agency that are represented 
by the philosophical literature35, understandings which are commonly understood as being 
mutually exclusive and irreconcilable. The conceptualization that will be discussed is as follows:  
An agent exercises her free will if and only if: 
(1) The agent is the ultimate originator of an action (executed intention) at a time ‘t’  
(2) At some time or other prior and up to time ‘t’ (which is the time of the action), the agent 
had the inherent (intrinsic) capacity (as an intrinsic property) in conjunction with the 
ability (it is within the agent’s power) to either refrain from the action or to execute the 
action (also applicable to the formation or refrain from forming an intention to act) 
(3) The agent’s reasons (ends or purpose) are not solely sufficient to causally determine the 
agent’s choice of action, though the agent acts in virtue of such reasons (though not 
always consciously aware of such reasons) the content of which are directed toward a 
goal or teleological end. 
These criteria comprise what has been traditionally understood to be an agent-causal 
account that presupposes the requirement of an agential source to ground responsibility (in 
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other words, these criteria are necessary (and jointly sufficient) conditions for the agent-causal 
libertarianism I will be discussing. (1) Is the sourcehood condition,36 (2) is the categorical ability 
condition, and (3) refers to the agential condition. In what follows, I shall consider each 
condition jointly and defend them against alternatives. 
 
Necessary Conditions for Freedom 
 
The sourcehood condition will be argued to be the foundation for human control in 
action from which the categorical ability condition follows and consequently, the agent-causal 
condition is to be understood in light of both. Traditionally, it has been argued that the ability 
to have done otherwise was the foundation and ground for agential responsibility. “Could have 
done otherwise” refers specifically to the idea that given two otherwise isomorphic possible 
worlds with the same description of a past sequence of events and the same set of laws of 
nature, the agent may either choose to exert her free will in acting or refrain from exerting her 
ability to act. The past events of both worlds are isomorphic and yet the agent makes radically 
different choices which are not determined (or probabilistically fixed) by the past.  
If they were either determined or probabilistically fixed by past events, the relevant 
choices would be contingent upon past events. The understanding that the agent’s choices are 
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not in any way contingent upon past events is known as the categorical ability of an agent to 
have done otherwise (as opposed to the mere conditional or hypothetical ability, had the past 
been different). The Principle of Alternative Possibilities has been argued to have been the very 
grounds by which an agent is in control of her action.  
The philosopher Harry Frankfurt illustrates his rejection of the Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities (shortened to PAP) as foundational of responsible agency by showing how an agent 
can act freely and yet be precluded from doing other than what she in fact had done. In the 
counterexamples he offers, the agent freely makes a choice in the actual world, but had she 
chosen not to have freely perform an action, she would have been coerced into making it. The 
idea here is that a hypothetical instance of coercion which acts as a fail-safe in case the agent 
does not freely choose in her own does not affect the fact that in the actual scenario she freely 
chose to make that same decision she would have been coerced into making had she chosen 
not to freely engage in that act. 
Frankfurt recognizes the hypothetical scenario to involve compulsion and therefore 
precludes free choice because the agent is coerced either by physical threat or by an action-
guiding device inserted inside of her brain which would coerce her to make the choice. She is 
asked to freely decide to perform an action (e.g. punch someone in the face) and if she decides 
to do so then she acted freely. If she had decided not to do so, she would have been coerced 
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into doing so. This is how Frankfurt eliminates PAP as a requirement for free agency, since the 
agent no longer has any alternative choices according to the argument.37  
There are several problems with his proposed counterexamples. Frankfurt assumes (but 
does not demonstrate) that a rejection of PAP will allow determinism to become compatible 
with moral responsibility and free agency.38 PAP was a generally recognized principle; both 
determinists and non-determinists accepted it. I briefly noted earlier the categorical ability of 
being able to have done otherwise. This is to be contrasted with the conditional (or 
hypothetical) analysis of the ability to have done otherwise offered by deterministic accounts of 
free will.39 In the conditional analysis, the agent could only have otherwise had past events 
been different in some relevant way such that the difference would have caused the agent to 
have done otherwise. 
In other words, the agent would have done otherwise had some prior condition 
obtained which would have caused the agent to have done otherwise. For example, had I 
desired to have punched a stranger in the face then I would have done so. Note that the action 
is conditional upon the prior desire to do so but the desire may be determined by antecedent 
events, and the desire itself (along with other determinants) may have caused the action. This is 
known as a compatibilist account of free will, and Frankfurt seems to advocate this causal 
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understanding of human action, although he argues that the conditional analysis is not even 
necessary in order for a person to have free will in a deterministic context. 
 This issue becomes clear when Frankfurt argues that if one eliminates any alternative 
possibilities (as the counterexamples attempt to do) then determinism would seem to be 
compatible with free will. In the examples he gives, Jones would be coerced in a hypothetical 
scenario if she chooses not to do what Black wants40. What Frankfurt fails to realize is that 
according to determinism, any action Jones performs (whether being coerced by Black or not) is 
still a form of compulsion (or necessitation). Her strongest desires cause her actions, while her 
desires are caused by antecedent events. Therefore, in the actual scenario in which Jones 
chooses what she desires (and is undisturbed by Black) she is still acting under compulsion (or 
necessitation) in that she is being acted upon by antecedent events and she is passively 
participating in an event that is beyond her direct control. The sources of the agent’s actions do 
not truly originate from within the agent, but are instead traced to events ultimately outside of 
her control. Prior events necessitate her action, and so it seems to be fair to count her action as 
being compelled to occur. External necessitation and compulsion seem to be synonymous in 
these instances.  
Therefore, eliminating the requirement of alternative possibilities would not seem 
relevant to formulating conditions necessary for moral responsibility. Even if we allow for 
alternative possibilities, the alternative possibilities envisioned by Frankfurt are understood as 
being conditional. Alternative possibilities within a deterministic universe are not categorical, 
                                                          
40
 Ibid, 834-837. 
28 
 
but rather a full description of Jones’ beliefs, desires and disposition alongside a full description 
of the Universe prior and up to the instant of her decision will suffice to determine exactly what 
choice she will make.   
A categorical understanding of PAP precludes a full description of the universe and the 
constitution of the agent up to the moment of decision from entailing or determining any 
choice. This implies that there is a causal gap between the moment prior to and the moment of 
the choice of the agent.41 The event prior to the choice and the event after the choice are not 
causally connected; the agent is causally connected to the event of the choice and the event 
caused by the choice. This causal gap is due to the fact that the causal efficacy of the agent was 
not determined by prior events but rather the agent contributes sui generis causal power since 
the agent acts as a first cause (as opposed to acting as part of an event).  
Categorical PAP seems relevant to free choice, but hypothetical (i.e. conditional) PAP 
seems irrelevant to free choice because even when Jones performs an actual “free” choice he 
seems to make that choice by physical necessity. Frankfurt rightly eschews PAP but the PAP he 
rejects is the conditional understanding of it. Such an understanding of PAP is irrelevant to 
moral responsibility (due to the consequence of being externally necessitated to act). He has 
not yet formulated an argument against the categorical understanding of PAP. Here Frankfurt 
might protest that a categorical understanding of PAP has not yet been established as being 
relevant to free choice. If the conditional analysis fails, why should the categorical analysis fare 
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any better? My criticism of determinism did not make mention of the categorical analysis of 
PAP, so how can it be relevant to moral responsibility?  
In response, I would argue that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral responsibility. Traditionally it has been 
understood that to be morally responsible is nothing more than to simply be able to have 
chosen otherwise. I have already shown why this is an inadequate understanding of moral 
responsibility. Even determinists have an understanding of PAP which precludes genuine free 
choice. Moral agency cannot be understood simply in terms of PAP. There is another notion 
which is more fundamental, namely the requirement of origination (sourcehood) or of being an 
ultimate source for your action (as was mentioned earlier).  
An agent can have the ability to do otherwise and yet fail to be the ultimate source of 
her choices. She can be the immediate source of her actions in that her intentions are formed 
by her reasons and deliberation. However, the act of deliberating and the beliefs and desires 
which form the intention are caused to do so by events that are traceable to events ultimately 
outside of the agent’s control. In this respect, a deterministic theory of action fails to ground 
the control sufficient for moral agency. She is simply not in control of her choices. Here is where 
Frankfurt’s possible objection would be placed: Why assume that a categorical understanding 
of PAP (one where past events do not determine whether or not a specific choice will be made 
and thus the agent is the difference-maker) is metaphysically significant as opposed to a 
conditional understanding of PAP?  
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PAP is relevant to moral agency but it is only in virtue of the agent’s being the ultimate 
intrinsic source for one’s actions that PAP becomes metaphysically relevant. PAP is merely a 
necessary byproduct of the agent’s actions being traceable to the agent alone. The agent’s 
control over forming intentions (not the agent’s features forming intentions beyond the agent’s 
control) is what grounds moral responsibility and what entails PAP as a byproduct. It is a 
byproduct of the agent’s control only if the agent is not necessitated to cause the intention 
(action) and therefore by implication could have done otherwise.  Note that PAP is not 
fundamental to our understanding of moral responsibility. The origination or source 
requirement is fundamental, but PAP is necessary in that the categorical analysis of PAP is 
entailed from the origination requirement. Free agency requires the agent to be the ultimate 
source of her action.  
Moreover, free agency requires that nothing about the agent’s constitution should 
determine or necessitate the choices she makes. This means that it is wholly up to the agent 
whether to act or not. Since it is not a part of the agent’s constitution whether a specific choice 
is made, she can also refrain from making a choice. She does not act by a necessity of her own 
nature (choice x is not necessarily entailed by her own nature). For the agent to be free she 
must be the origin of her action and she must not act by necessity. This feature grounds a 
sufficient amount of control (as opposed to nomological or metaphysical necessitation). 
This sourcehood entails a categorical understanding of the principle of alternative 
possibilities. Consequently, as the sole originator of her action, the agent’s reasons for action 
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cannot be the sole cause of the agent’s subsequent act of will.42 This feature would preclude 
any theories of free will which require the event of a free action to be completely causally 
determined by antecedent events which are not within the control of the agent (and do not 
ultimately originate from within the agent). I will now turn to the agent-causal notion of 
explanation in human action and O’Connor’s strategy for dismantling possible objections to the 
absence of contrastive explanation in agent-causal human action. After that discussion, we 
should have an adequate understanding of agent-causal freedom (as O’Connor defends it) and 
objections to his view will be considered. 
 
Choice and Contrastive Explanation 
 
There is nothing about the reason acted upon that compels the person to act for that 
reason. If an agent is deliberating between two competing and equally impressive reasons, the 
only explanation to be given as to why the agent chose reason A over reason B is that the agent 
was simply more impressed with A rather than B. In O’Connor’s view, there is no further 
explanation for that contrastive fact.43 If there were an explanation as for why the agent was 
more impressed by A rather than B, then we would be able to determine beforehand what 
mechanism would make reason A seem more impressive to the agent than B (and this would 
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become explained in terms of events that involve the agent as a constituent rather than being a 
purely agential cause, which is what O’Connor is attempting to avoid). To give an example, 
Laura has the opportunity to either (A) work for the family business, or (B) attend graduate 
school at a prestigious university. Laura initially finds both of these reasons to be equally 
compelling, but ends up choosing A as opposed to B.  
One cannot give an explanation for the fact that Laura found the reason(s) supporting A 
more impressive than the reason(s) supporting B. She just found them more compelling and 
that is all. If one could explain why she found the reasons for A more compelling, then not only 
would one have an explanation for why she had chosen A, but one could also explain why she 
could not have chosen B. Given this explanation, she could not have chosen B but must have 
chosen A. This explanation would presumably lie outside of the agent herself (the reasons 
would likely have sufficient causal efficacy in producing the intention to act) and would have to 
determine how and why she chooses A over B.  
No longer would the agent be responsible for the forming of the intention to act, but it 
would be the event of her possessing certain reasons which would explain the forming of the 
intention. The laws of nature would ensure that whenever an event of this type occurs (the 
same possession of the same reasons by the agent in identical circumstances), the same 
intention would be formed. This is a classic example of causation in terms of events (involving 
an agent) as opposed to causation triggered ultimately by the agent. In the former, the agent 
has no independent say in the matter (since events are essentially connected by laws of 
33 
 
nature). Only an agent-causal picture would allow for the agent to be in full control of her 
choices, although we would have to sacrifice a traditional understanding of explanation in order 
to give the agent full control in the forming of her intentions.  
The same principle noted here applies to the timing of certain decisions. Why did Laura 
choose to act upon her reasons in March instead of in April? Reasons certainly played a 
significant role in this act, but more significantly, there were reasons involved which she found 
compelling (reasons regarding the timing of said decision). One might argue that her acting for 
these reasons is non-explanatory, but it can also be argued that her acting for these reasons is 
self-explanatory. It is self-explanatory in the sense that she chose to work for her family 
business in April because she found the reasons for it more compelling, in conjunction with the 
fact that her possession of agent-causal freedom allows her to act for reasons without there 
being a contrastive explanation for why she did not act otherwise. The explanation for why 
there is no contrastive explanation available is that free actions by definition cannot have 
contrastive definitions.44 This does not mean, however, that free actions have no explanation 
simpliciter. The explanation for why Laura chose to work in the family business is that she 
found the relevant reasons associated with that choice ultimately persuasive.  
An advocate for event-causal free will might argue that agent-causal libertarianism 
would refute the Principle of Sufficient Reason if it is the case that Laura’s choice to act upon 
the reasons for A rather than the reasons for B is not explainable in principle other than the 
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simple restatement of the fact in question (viz. she was simply impressed by the reasons for A 
over the reasons for B, which begs the issue). The Principle of Sufficient Reason is the thesis 
that every fact has an explanation for its obtaining. Leibniz (the most well-known formulator of 
this thesis) asserted: “…we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, 
unless there be a sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise…”45  
One must follow the logic of this assertion. Not only is the explanans (the entity or 
proposition doing the explaining) going to explain why the explanandum (the entity in need of 
an explanation) is true, but it must also explain why it is not such that it must be false. In 
Laura’s case, all she can demonstrate is that she chose reason for A because she was impressed 
by it (she can explain why the explanandum came to be true) but she cannot explain why it was 
not the case that she chose to carry out the reason for B instead (or in other words, why it 
cannot be the case that it is false that she did not choose and carry out A). Thus she must 
explain why it is not the case (or why it is false) that A was not chosen. All she can do, however, 
is simply restate the fact that she did chose A which does not answer the challenge to offer a 
contrastive explanation for why one state of affairs obtained as opposed to another.  
In order for this contrastive condition to be fulfilled, the reason acting as the explanans 
must be sufficient for the action such that its existence is sufficient for the action (which 
consequently makes the action inseparable from the reason). Excising the action from its 
occurrence would eliminate the reason from existence. Similarly, affirming the existence of the 
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reason and the strength thereof would necessarily entail the action which follows. An agent-
causal libertarian would argue against the necessary entailment relationship between a reason 
and the agent’s acting upon it, but this is the situation the libertarian finds herself in. 
If one wants to explain why this state of affairs is not such that choice A is not acted 
upon, one must appeal to the reason for A and that reason must act as a sufficient and 
necessitating condition which brought that state of affairs about. If the reason for A exists in 
the state and strength to which it does exist, it must have brought about the action associated 
with it. Agent-causal libertarianism does not sit well with this view, as a reason can exist in any 
state and still not compel an action to occur.  
 In this case, one may have to settle for a weaker version of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, since there are certain facts (such as contrastive facts) which cannot be explained. 
However, it may be that contrastive facts regarding free actions are self-explanatory. In other 
words, due to the nature of agent-causal freedom, certain facts do not require any further 
explanation. Paradoxically, the explanation for why there is no explanation is that no 
explanation is needed. Just as there are necessary self-explanatory facts (analytic truths such 
as: ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’) there are also contingent self-explanatory truths (truths 
regarding acts of freedom such as: ‘Laura acted on reasons for A as opposed to reasons for B’). 
O’Connor has embraced a similar weak form of the PSR.46  
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O’Connor has argued that reasons (belief-desire pairs in his view)47 are not sufficient to 
form an intention, though they are a necessary condition for an intention (and so weakly-
explains why the agent acts).  There is the remaining issue of internal influences upon our 
choices. Certain habits make it more likely that we prefer to act upon certain reasons over 
others. For O’Connor, reasons “increase the probability” of an agent’s forming a certain 
intention. Reasons shape the propensity or likelihood of future intentions, but O’Connor makes 
it clear that reasons are not probabilistic causes of future intentions. Only the agent causes 
intentions, though her propensity to do so is structured by the reasons she possesses.  
Therefore, reasons structure the tendency or propensity of an agent to solely cause her 
intentions, though the reasons themselves are causally inefficacious.48 Now that we have an 
agent-causal theory of libertarian free will from which to work with, in the next section we shall 
analyze the metaphysics of reduction and supervenience in order to adjudicate O’Connor’s view 
vis-à-vis naturalism and physicalism. 
 
The Supervenience Relation and Emergence 
 
Having this model of free will in mind, one must ask whether or not this model is 
compatible with a broadly naturalistic worldview. Timothy O’Connor has proposed a view that 
would allow this form of free will (generally referred to as an ‘agent-causal libertarian’ 
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conception of free will) to be reconciled with our best empirical theories.49 While O’Connor 
holds to a generally naturalistic view of the human person, he manages to allow for the 
irreducibility of consciousness (he is not a reductive materialist when describing mental 
states).50 He is, however, a substance materialist regarding human persons. The human person 
is not an immaterial soul or a mystical entelechy, but rather a completely physical substance 
with full-fledged physical features which nevertheless exhibits irreducibly non-physical states of 
consciousness which supervene over the physical states and processes of the person (namely, 
brain states and processes). The notion of supervenience must be unpacked further.51   
The supervenience thesis asserts that there is a necessary covariance between two 
properties such that if property A is supervenient on property B, there can be no changes in 
property B without there being changes in property A. Supervenience qua supervenience is a 
very broad notion that has many different definitions. Timothy O’Connor’s model relies on a 
notion of mental supervenience which asserts that supervenient emergent mental properties 
are causally preserved by a subvenient base property (more on this later). 
The pertinent point is that supervenience qua supervenience applies to more than one 
ontological relationship of covariance between properties. For instance, one may discover that 
A supervenes on B because A is identical to B (e.g. water is H20). Or perhaps A supervenes upon 
B because B (or a group of B) either constitutes part of or all of A. Or B non-causally explains A 
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(e.g. Murder is wrong because it is the killing of an innocent person). In the murder case, there 
is an explanatory co-variance (co-variance of A and B using an “in virtue of” relation). 
  In O’Connor’s case, the supervenience relationship most pertinent to his model of 
consciousness (and even free agency) is one that relates a causally sustaining subvenient base 
property to an irreducible emergent property (this description will be further elucidated).52 All 
of these aforementioned kinds of co-variance relationships between properties are subsumed 
under the umbrella of supervenience and can be described, as David Lewis himself described it, 
as a denial of independent variation and an affirmation of dependent variation. O’Connor 
argues that consciousness is an irreducibly simple kind of feature (he notes that it has 
“nonstructurality”)53 that causally emerges from the complex causal interaction of the parts, 
processes and features of the physical organism.  
These micro-physical parts have properties that are paired with other properties and 
mutually interact and manifest property-complexes, but when this pattern of structured 
substantial parts and properties reach a certain threshold of biological complexity, the whole 
organism exhibits a new simple feature that it did not initially possess.54 This feature is not 
describable using scientific predicates or the objective languages of biology, physics and 
chemistry. The feature here is subjectivity or consciousness. The predicates of physics cannot 
begin to describe the feature or processes of subjective phenomenal states, according to 
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O’Connor. This particular claim will not be pursued here, but this assertion of emergence is 
relevant for O’Connor claim regarding the presence of free will within human organisms.  
An emergent property, for O’Connor, is a nonstructural (simple) feature of an entity that 
cannot be reduced to (or be explained in terms of, or be identified with) a set or collection of 
properties belonging to the entity’s parts or its whole.55 In order to illustrate this by means of 
its opposite, consider a structural property (or feature) of an entity (or substance). Water is a 
paradigmatic example in this respect. Water has the property of being identical to H20. Is 
“identical to H20” a structural property or a nonstructural property? One can successfully 
identify H20 with a set of properties belonging to its parts (or properties which are true of its 
whole), namely one oxygen atom (its part) having the property of being bonded with two 
distinct hydrogen atoms which have the similar property of being bonded to one another. The 
property of being “identical to H20” is nothing over and above (and therefore nothing more 
than) the possession of the aforementioned set of properties. Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu 
Wong have endorsed a succinct definition for their understanding of a structural property, 
which is as follows: 
 
“A property, S, is structural if and only if proper parts of particulars having S have properties not 
identical with S and jointly stand in relation R, and this state of affairs is the particular’s having 
S.”56 
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By contrast, a simple (and therefore nonstructural) emergent property is one which is 
not constituted by a more basic set of properties and thus cannot be ontologically reduced to 
that set. It cannot be classified under an understanding of supervenience which relates 
structural supervenient properties with its more basic (and constitutive) subvenient base. 
Rather, the only way to understand a genuinely sui generis emergent property is to view it as 
being causally maintained (as opposed to being constituted) by its subvenient base. The 
subvenient base literally causes it to exist. O’Connor and Wong say as much when they opine: 
“Emergent properties are nonstructural properties of composite individuals. We further 
presume that they arise from and are sustained by underlying microstructures.”57 
This explains O’Connor’s view on conscious states of the brain. The sensation of pain 
seems to be utterly basic and irreducible to physical states, and O’Connor categorizes such 
sensations (or qualia) as emergent properties belonging to the brain. Note that the sensation is 
still a state of the brain, but rather than being reducible to a collection of physical properties of 
the brain, it is a genuinely unique feature of the brain that is caused by subvenient physical 
states (of the brain) rather than being constituted by these relevant states. For O’Connor, the 
subjective sensation of pain is not in any way identical to a mereologically structured set of 
objective states of neuron-firings in the brain. However, they are caused by them. In the next 
section, we will consider the distinctions between a weak understanding of emergence and a 
strong understanding of emergence.  
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Structural Properties and Emergence 
 
In some of the philosophical literature on the topic of emergence, structural properties 
have been said to “emerge” but only in the sense that they have a different level of description 
than its more basic constitutive properties. In other words, they are semantically (or 
conceptually) emergent properties. This amounts to the claim that structural properties of a 
substance are described (and understood) differently than the individual properties (or even 
proper parts of the substance) individually considered. They are emergent only by way of its 
description. A new description entails a new concept which is expressed by said description. 
Simply because we have a new concept does not mean that we have a sui generis basic 
property that is caused to exist by its subvenient base.  
We certainly learn new concepts from “emergent” properties that are structural in 
nature, but this knowledge simply amounts to knowledge of the interrelatedness of its spatial 
and geometric properties and the powerful interactions of its parts. We have a different 
concept of water as we know it than we do of H20 as a molecular structure. Simply because we 
have these conceptual distinctions does not mean that water’s properties are caused by H20. 
One does not cause the other precisely because one is nothing but the other. They are one and 
the same. This weaker form of emergence is identical to the understanding of supervenience I 
briefly summarized earlier in this thesis; structural properties are ontologically identical (though 
not epistemologically indiscernible) to a set of simpler properties, even though one may 
42 
 
describe this identity relationship as one of co-variance such that the supervenient base is 
dependent upon the subvenient base. 
In the literature, this form of “emergence” has been called “weak emergence”58 and 
“epistemological emergence” in contrast to “strong emergence” and “ontological emergence”59 
which characterizes O’Connor’s description of emergent consciousness. Correspondingly, in the 
former model of emergence, there are no causal or sustaining hierarchies of being or reality 
(there are no properties or proper parts of entities causing higher-level properties to exist). 
There are only levels of description from the inside-out or from the bottom-up. A collection of 
atoms does not cause a chair to exist; the chair is composed and is nothing more than the 
collection of atoms described by different linguistic predicates (expressing slightly different 
concepts). In weak emergence, there are higher and lower-level descriptions of the same 
phenomena which entail one another. John Searle borrows an example from Roger Sperry to 
illustrate the naturalistic understanding of emergence: 
 
“Consider a wheel rolling down hill. The wheel is entirely made of molecules. The behavior of 
the molecules causes the higher-level, or system feature of solidity. Notice that the solidity 
affects the behavior of the individual molecules. The trajectory of each molecule is affected by 
the behavior of the entire solid wheel. But of course there is nothing there but molecules. The 
wheel consists entirely of molecules. 
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So when we say the solidity functions causally in the behavior of the wheel and in the behavior 
of the individual molecules that compose the wheel, we are not saying that the solidity is 
something in addition to the molecules; rather, it is just the condition that the molecules are in. 
But the feature of solidity is nonetheless a real feature, and it has real causal effects.”60 
 
Searle’s language of “causation” can be misleading since solidity is not caused to exist by 
the behavior of the molecules, but rather the behavior of the molecules explains the 
phenomenon of solidity (which is nothing but the behavior of the molecules). Similarly, his 
assertion that solidity has an effect upon the individual molecules may lead one to believe that 
solidity has autonomous causal powers distinct from the behavior of the molecules, but this 
would be a misunderstanding of weak emergence. Instead, it is more appropriate to 
understand the solidity of the wheel as having inherited causal powers (powers inherited solely 
from the behavior of the molecules) since solidity is simply a higher-level (or broader) 
description of what happens at the lower-level (solidity is a description of the structure and 
behavior of the molecules, but solidity qua solidity leaves out molecule interaction in its 
definition). Solidity does not exert any unique causal powers not already found in the lower (or 
micro) levels. The naturalistic understanding of supervenience and property emergence is 
radically different from O’Connor’s view of both. Searle concurs: 
“Since all of the surface features of the world are entirely caused by and realised in systems of 
micro-elements, the behavior of micro-elements is sufficient to determine everything that 
happens. Such a 'bottom up' picture of the world allows for top-down causation (our minds, for 
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example, can affect our bodies). But top-down causation only works because the top level is 
already caused by and realized in the bottom levels.”61 
 
O’Connor’s discussed model of emergence, on the other hand, relies upon a bottom-up 
depiction of reality in which the subvenient neurons (for example) undergo a process of firings 
causing a higher-level feature (pain) to come into existence. Here we have the notion of 
causation (or, at the very least, determination) that brings pain into existence. O’Connor and 
Wong state: 
 
“If their appearance in certain systems is to be explained at all, they must be explained in terms 
of a causal, not purely formal, relationship to underlying, immediately preceding structures.”62  
 
Unlike Searle’s model, O’Connor allows for the macro-property of pain, for instance, to 
cause certain changes within the micro-properties of the person without the need for pain itself 
to be realized in the bottom-levels. Pain (as a property) comes into existence from nothing and 
so neither it nor its parts (as it has no property-parts) can be realized in lower-level features of 
the brain. In the next chapter, I will bring O’Connor’s theory of agent-causalism into view and 
examine the metaphysical implications it has for naturalism and physicalism. 
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CHAPTER 3: NATURALIZING FREE WILL 
 
O’Connor not only holds to a bottom-up causal picture, but he also defends a top-down 
causal picture in which pain causes a person to behave in certain ways. In other words, the 
feature of pain exerts a downward causal impact upon the neurons of the brain which result in 
the person developing a new plan of action.63 Now it seems appropriate to introduce 
O’Connor’s conception of free agency. O’Connor views free will as a dispositional capacity64 
possessed by rational human persons, the same persons which possess rational faculties 
sufficient for rational deliberation. O’Connor accepts an agent-causal account of libertarian free 
will and eschews an event-causal account of free will. In his account, the agent has a set of 
beliefs and desires which represent possible courses of action (for O’Connor, a belief-desire 
pairing constitutes a reason for action).65  
When an agent is satisfied with a proposed belief-desire pair and its represented goal 
for which to act, the agent executes or brings about the desired action via an intention. Usually, 
this takes the form of an “executive intention” which is an intention to immediately carry out 
an intended act.66 Therefore, the intention causes a bodily movement, though your intending is 
not an event caused by prior events (though it causes a subsequent event, namely the bodily 
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movement). This is how the agent-causal feature distinctively characterizes O’Connor’s 
approach over that of the compatibilist which seeks to reconcile event-causation with free 
will.67 The person possesses a sui generis nonstructural property which is the intrinsically active 
power to form intentions to act. O’Connor argues that the causal influence of the emergent 
property is not in any way inherited nor is the emergent property reducible to the subvening 
properties: 
 
“…the occurrence of an emergent property is a function of certain joint causal 
potentialities of underlying base properties. Consequently, the continuing instantiation of the 
emergent property is completely dependent on some set of properties or disjunctive range of 
properties in the object’s microstructure. Yet it [the emergent property] exerts a causal 
influence on the micro-level pattern of events that is not reducible to the immediate causal 
potentialities of subvening properties.”68 
 
This notion of top-down causation will be an issue for O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in the 
following section. 
 
 
 
                                                          
67
 O’Connor rehearses the dialectics of the both the compatibilist v. incompatibilist and the event-cause v. agent-
cause debate in Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 67-73. 
68
 Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
111-112. 
47 
 
Causal Unity and Non-Reductionism 
 
Having now described Timothy O’Connor’s model of libertarian free agency, some 
worries will be raised for his reconciliatory view on naturalism and agent-causal libertarian free 
will. O’Connor describes two theses in his work ‘Persons & Causes’. The first thesis is the 
“Causal Unity of Nature” thesis, while the second is the “Micro-Macro Constitution” thesis. As 
mentioned previously, O’Connor is not a reductionist regarding the nature either of 
consciousness or of free agency. He eschews the “Constitution” thesis which asserts that 
consciousness is nothing but a set of micro-properties (a structural property).69 In this view, a 
mental state like pain is nothing but the firing of neurons and c-fibers (which each are 
composed of atomic components which have their own set of properties and relational 
features). O’Connor argues that consciousness is a simple emergent property as opposed to a 
structural property that is reduced to (and identified with) a set of micro-properties, and 
therefore rejects constitution in favor of the Causal Unity thesis, which asserts that there is a 
connected fabric of nature which causally connects micro-physical phenomena to micro-
physical phenomena. The Constitution thesis entails the Causal Unity thesis, but the Causal 
Unity thesis can be defended without recourse to the Constitution thesis.70 O’Connor argues 
that his position is consistent with naturalism because he accepts the causal unity of nature (all 
non-basic properties in the universe ultimately supervene upon physical properties).  
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O’Connor uses the Causal Unity thesis to allow for the emergence of the simple property 
of consciousness from mereologically complex micro-properties.  Having defended the 
emergence of consciousness as a non-physical and nonstructural (i.e. simple) property in his 
work, O’Connor adopts a similar strategy in maintaining that the agent-causal capacity (faculty) 
of the physical person is a strongly emergent property. The relevant property supervenes upon 
the microstructure of the agent while not being reducible to the microstructure and structural 
properties (e.g. spatial configurations and interactions between the micro-parts) that relate 
each of the micro-entities that constitute the agent.  In this sense, the agent-causal capacity 
one possesses is fundamentally irreducible. It is a sui generis property that comes into existence 
via the structural properties of the whole organism. In other words, it is caused to exist.  
O’Connor has acknowledged the causal coming to be of the emergent property but 
notes that this is not an instance of “something coming from nothing”71 but an instance of the 
determination of the emergent by the more fundamental features of the entity in question. 
However, this acknowledgement of his fails to address the fact that this emergence is an 
instance of creation ex nihilo (creation out of nothing), though of a simple property rather than 
of a substance. By the term “simple property”, I refer to a monadic property (or quality) 
belonging to a substance (a simple property like solidity), as opposed to a merely relational 
feature (e.g. an arrangement) which represents a configuration that parts of a whole stand in 
relation to each other. Emergentists such as O’Connor posit the coming to be of monadic 
(simple) properties by the causal interaction of micro-entities arranged in a certain structure 
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(such as in the human organism), with the micro-entities possessing certain monadic properties 
and causally interacting with one another (relational properties/features). Both kinds of 
properties are the properties of the person which give rise (causally, not merely explanatorily) 
to the nonstructural (simple) monadic property of the agent-causal capacity.  
This seems to be a classic example of creation out of nothing. The causal powers of the 
agent-causal capacity are not inherited by the combined causal powers of the parts (such as in 
weak emergence). The sui generis emergent property has its own unique powers not reducible 
to those of its subvenient sustaining base. This means that the agent qua agent has causal 
powers that cannot be explained as the mere aggregation of the causal powers of the micro-
entities that compose the agent, and thus these micro-entities cannot predict or determine the 
causal activity of the emergent freely-acting agent (keep in mind O’Connor’s rejection of the 
“Micro-Macro Constitution thesis”). The whole organism has agent-causal powers that are not 
determined by the laws of nature nor by the parts of the organism that are determined by the 
laws of nature. They are, however, causally sustained by the laws of nature together with the 
micro-constituents of the organism. The human organism is, after all, a physical substance on 
O’Connor’s view (and agents are substances).  
Not only are these agent-causal powers independent of (and not determined by) the 
laws of nature, but they seem to be able to violate the natural laws which regulate the micro-
parts (and the macro-entity). Downward causation consists in a macro-organism’s (as a free 
agent) exertion of power to influence and change the behavior of the micro-parts. An instance 
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of this would be the raising of one’s hand. The agent has reasons for and against the raising of 
her hand, but she is impressed by the reasons for doing it. The agent self-determines herself to 
form the immediate intention to execute that action, and once it occurs, the agent-causal 
powers exert an influence upon certain portions of the brain which influence the central 
nervous system and so forth, leading to the raising of the hand. This resultant event of arm-
raising can also be described using the micro-language of physics which describes the language 
at a lower-level of description (the language of physics or chemistry) rather than a biological 
one (e.g. the intention causing molecules to interact in certain ways). The point here is that the 
agent can, by her free act, divert the natural course of events. In the next section, several major 
objections will be presented against O’Connor’s model and some rebuttals will be considered.  
 
Creatio Ex Nihilo and Emergence 
 
The main objection I will lay against O’Connor’s naturalistic model of free will concerns 
the emergence of free will from physical complexity ex nihilo (out of/from nothing). O’Connor 
acknowledges that his view commits him to the conclusion that a genuinely unique disposition 
(or capacity) is created that is itself not constituted by the physical properties which cause it to 
exist. This strongly emergent view would seem to commit him to understanding this agent-
causal property as being created out of no pre-existing properties. It would amount to a unique 
form of creation out of nothing.  
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It is paradigmatically non-naturalistic for the agent-causal property to emerge ex nihilo 
as opposed to simply being a new way in which micro-particulars are spatially and geometrically 
arranged (which thereby stand in different relations to one another and possess the properties 
of standing in such relations). The latter view understands capacities and dispositions in terms 
of the ways in which certain molecules are arranged, which entail certain behaviors between 
the molecules (which are described in terms of capacities and dispositions). The former view 
goes even further and claims that the ways in which certain molecules are arranged can cause a 
new property to emerge that is not described as a structured or complex way 
(property/feature) in which the molecules exist (namely their behavior and arrangement).  
The molecule-collection themselves do have interesting properties, however. They have 
the disposition to cause the organism that they constitute to possess free will. This latent 
capacity is manifested when these molecules are arranged and interact in a very complex 
fashion, according to O’Connor. The disposition to cause the agent-causal capacity to exist 
within an agent is not identical to the agent-causal disposition itself. This disposition to cause 
properties (namely the agent-causal capacity) to exist from nothing is uncharacteristic of other 
physical properties, and should cause any naturalist to pause when categorizing this 
dispositional property as naturalistic.  
To press the issue further, if properties can emerge ex nihilo after a certain threshold of 
complexity is reached, there seems to be a number of unwelcome consequences to this 
allowance. For instance, one could allow for the possibility that a subvenient base’s properties 
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necessitate a supervening property that is the disposition to create objects ex nihilo (as 
opposed to the disposition to freely enact intentions, as in O’Connor’s account). A naturalist 
would find it difficult to allow for such qualities (or dispositions) to be admitted into her 
naturalistic ontology. How would a naturalist allow for structural properties which necessitate 
(via creation ex nihilo) a further genuine and sui generis property which allows a substance to 
create other substances ex nihilo and yet deny material objects the ability to create other 
substances ex nihilo? 
There seems to be no principled metaphysical distinction between a substance that can 
create something (e.g. another substance or a proper part of itself) from nothing and a 
substance that acts freely in virtue of the creation of a sui generis nonstructural property from 
nothing. If one is paradigmatically unnatural (namely matter creating something from nothing), 
then the other must also be admitted into a supernaturalistic ontology. The same would be the 
case if a substance had the intrinsic property of extinguishing from existence certain other 
substances (the ability to annihilate certain substances, or even properties). Such a quality is 
undeniably unnatural and unaccounted for by any naturalistic epistemology, but such a 
property is not radically disparate from the dispositional property to create the agent-causal 
capacity ex nihilo, or the property to act in the absence of sufficiently necessitating event 
causes.  
There seems to be no significant metaphysical difference between the disposition to 
create an agent-causal capacity from nothing which subsequently allows for intention-
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formation in the absence of events and the disposition (the disposition itself also emerging ex 
nihilo) to create matter ex nihilo. Neither disposition is to be found among the physical 
predicates of either physics or chemistry. Both dispositions seem to betray a supernaturalistic 
ontology. In what follows, I will present another objection which I argue to render O’Connor’s 
reconciliation between naturalism/physicalism and agent-causal libertarianism impossible.  
 
Naturalistic Libertarianism vis-à-vis Panprotopsychism  
 
The structure of Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is helpful in understanding the 
direction of my next argument. According to Jackson’s argument, no knowledge proffered by 
the physical sciences can yield phenomenal knowledge acquired by direct acquaintance.72 To 
summarize Jackson’s original argument, we are to imagine a scientist named Mary who has 
studied all facts relating to the human eye and color in a black-and-white room (she also has 
black-and-white glasses, for the sake of argument). She learns all of this theoretical information 
from within a room, but she eventually leaves the room and takes off her glasses, upon seeing a 
red flower she learns something new about the wavelength we know as red (but she did not 
recognize as having that quality with which we are acquainted). The argument is intended to 
show that phenomenal facts about red are not reducible to theoretical facts about the 
wavelength or the spectrum of light.  
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Philosopher Yujin Nagasawa formulates Jackson’s argument as follows: 
 
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know 
about other people. 
 
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know 
about other people (because she learns something about them on her 
release). 
 
Therefore, 
(3) There are true propositions about other people (and herself) that 
escape the physicalist story.73 
 
I, however, am not arguing for such a strong and controversial thesis. Rather, let us 
modify Jackson’s argument slightly such that it is not an argument for phenomenal knowledge 
as non-physical but (let us stipulate) an argument against knowledge of proto-consciousness, 
for example. Several philosophers have given parity-versions of Jackson’s argument in order to 
directly refute panprotopsychism in relation to physical substances.74 Panprotopsychism is the 
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metaphysical thesis in Philosophy of Mind that all physical substances are imbued with proto-
consciousness (which itself is not consciousness) such that in certain substances with a 
particular structural arrangement of proto-consciousness of a particular threshold will have full-
blown consciousness of the kind we know and love. One particular objection to this argument is 
the ‘combination problem’, namely, how do the properties of proto-consciousness combine to 
yield consciousness?75 On the one hand, the threshold to which these properties must be 
structurally arranged seems utterly contingent. Moreover, the properties themselves seem 
utterly mysterious and empirically unobservable (either directly or by implication). The thesis of 
panprotopsychism states, however, that the relationship between proto-consciousness and 
physical entities is one of strong metaphysical necessity (ranging across all possible worlds in 
which these physical entities exist), and proto-consciousness is not reducible to physical states 
of the entity.  
According to Jackson’s argument, Mary is confined in a black-and-white room and is not 
able to experience certain phenomenal states (e.g. seeing green, red, or blue). She is tasked 
with learning everything physical there is to know about other people. This information 
includes information about the visual mechanisms by which humans experience what they call 
green, red, blue and other colors. We may conclude that she comes to know everything 
physical there is to know about other persons. However, she is released from her room and 
experiences colors other than black and white. Did she learn anything new? The Knowledge 
Argument asserts that she did, namely the phenomenal experience of colors other than the 
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ones she had previously experienced in the room. This knowledge is not only knowledge of her 
experience, but knowledge of other persons and of how they experience the world. The 
argument concludes that physical knowledge of other persons is not phenomenal knowledge of 
other persons.  
The Knowledge Argument may be illuminating in this regard: No amount of physical 
knowledge of physical states can reveal any knowledge regarding states of consciousness. Now 
in order to find out if one can know about proto-phenomenal or proto-conscious states by 
learning physical facts, one can retain the structure of the argument and simply substitute the 
study of physical facts with the study of proto-phenomenal or proto-consciousness facts.  
It seems difficult to image what proto-conscious properties even are, let alone whether 
they can lead to knowledge of phenomenal properties. It gets even worse for the 
panprotopsychist, for even if the subject of study were physical facts (as in the original thought-
experiment) a study of physical facts would never yield knowledge of proto-phenomenal facts. 
Therefore, it looks as if proto-consciousness is not physical and faces the same epistemological 
and metaphysical dilemma as regular states of phenomenal consciousness. No amount of 
physical information will generate a deductive apparatus by which we can infer any proto-
conscious or consequently conscious mental states that are formed as a result of a structural 
interaction between proto-conscious properties.  
O’Connor’s naturalistic libertarianism is analogous to panprotopsychism in that 
O’Connor posits physical properties with supernatural-properties which are such that if 
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combined with other physical properties, they create a new property (viz. a capacity) which 
emerges ex nihilo and is not inferable from the subvenient base (the physical substances along 
with its properties). But neither are the supernatural-properties (which cause the agent-causal 
capacity to exist) inferable from their physical base. The subvenient-supervenient relationship 
in both instances seem utterly contingent (as O’Connor himself acknowledges) as is the 
subvenient-supervenient relationship found in panprotopsychism. In panprotopsychism, the 
proto-conscious properties arrange and interact in such a fashion that a novel property (viz. the 
capacity of consciousness) emerges ex nihilo, similar to O’Connor’s agent-causal capacity.  
Moreover, the actualization of the agent-causal capacity results in the agent’s 
possession of yet another simple (nonstructural) property, the state of acting freely for x (which 
is not ontologically reducible to nor decomposable into any other property). The state of acting 
freely is analogous to the state of being conscious for the panprotopsychist. Both states (i.e. 
both mental states, the former being a freely-formed intentional state) are strongly emergent 
states of the biological organism, and both are non-identical to the dispositional capacities of 
the biological organism. So, in reality, the naturalistic libertarian is dealing with two main 
instances of strong emergence: the emergence of the mere capacity to act freely and the very 
exertion of a free choice via the forming of an intention. The former has been discussed at 
length earlier in this chapter and the latter is being introduced now only to compare it with the 
claims of panprotopsychism. If panprotopsychism is to be rejected tout court by the naturalist 
for its blatant supernaturalism then it is only appropriate for her to reject O’Connor’s 
libertarianism. In summary, both O’Connor’s naturalistic libertarianism and panprotopsychism 
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seem to posit exotic matter in some form or other, which are a vestige of supernaturalism. I will 
conclude with some comments on the nature of supernaturalism and whether my arguments 
are sufficient to refute O’Connor’s naturalistic libertarianism. 
 
Free Will and Supernaturalism (Conclusion) 
 
 I have already proposed several objections to O’Connor’s reconciliatory naturalism, 
namely the violation of the causal closure (in my interaction with Searle’s naturalistic 
libertarianism in Chapter 1), the creation of the agent-causal capacity ex nihilo, and the parity 
case between a ‘physical’ object with the disposition to create other entities ex nihilo (or 
annihilate other entities) and a substance which can produce the agent-causal capacity ex 
nihilo, and the parity case (using Jackson’s argument) between panprotopsychism and 
naturalistic libertarianism. Timothy O’Connor (and other reconciliatory naturalists) might rebut 
my objections by pointing out my failure to demonstrate that agent-causal free will requires 
any immaterial faculty or disposition. In other words, the disposition is not intrinsically 
immaterial in the same fashion that, say, a phenomenal or intentional mental property (in 
O’Connor’s view) would be characteristically mental and inaccessible to physics. Indeed, if free 
will exists, it would be publicly-accessible for all to witness (since it is merely a disposition of a 
physical substance).  
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 However, I would argue that immaterialism is not the only kind of supernaturalistic 
position that one may adopt. Immaterialism may be a sufficient condition for supernaturalism, 
but it is not a necessary condition. One may be a materialist and still reject the metaphysical 
presuppositions which underlie physicalism and naturalism (e.g. causal closure, bottom-up 
hierarchical view of reality, impossibility of top-down causation, the naturalistic epistemic 
stance). Materialism is co-extensive with neither physicalism nor naturalism; materialism is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for either and materialism is a sufficient condition for 
supernaturalism but not a necessary one. It may seem odd to be a materialist and not a 
naturalist, but naturalism has certain implications which materialism does not.  
 For example, a naturalistic universe could not possibly be populated by physical 
substances (e.g. zombies) possessing the disposition to produce non-physical mental states (like 
pain) and happen to never manifest those dispositions (the dispositions are never actualized). 
One may wonder how that would render such a possible world non-naturalistic. It has nothing 
to do with the presence of immaterial properties, since it has already been stipulated that these 
dispositions to produce mental states are never actualized. However, the question remains as 
to whether these dispositions are purely physical or semi or quasi-mental properties. These 
zombies are not themselves conscious, but if they drank an elixir, perhaps their mental 
dispositions would be actualized. These very dispositions are not physical properties but rather 
quasi-mental properties (despite not being immaterial).  
 This argument suffices to show that immateriality is not a necessary condition for a 
rejection of naturalism. Similarly, if some powerful being (for example, Zeus) was composed of 
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some exotic matter which disposed him to create matter from absolutely nothing, this would 
contradict the relevant theses of naturalism. It is sufficient to show that these relevant 
properties are not found within the predicates of our most advanced physical theories in 
science (or perhaps of any future science in principle) in order to conclude that free will is not 
compatible with naturalism. Although O’Connor’s reconciliatory attempt asks for too much, we 
may be forced to rest content with a materialistic position that eschews causal closure, a solely 
bottom-up hierarchical view of causal reality, and the naturalistic epistemic stance. 
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